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Aligning Nietzsche’s “Genealogical” Philosophy With Democratic 
Educational Reform 
 
James M. Magrini  
 
Jonas and Nakazawa (2008) write that Nietzsche’s epistemological “perspectivism” holds 
potential value for education, which is an understanding of truth that is pragmatic, or 
instrumental, in nature. Nietzsche’s philosophy of knowledge, “demands that students be 
rigorously inculcated into a pedagogical framework that teaches students to discern between 
‘truth’ and ‘falsity.’ This framework is essential for the development of an intellectually robust 
and life-affirming culture” (p. 269). This statement requires unpacking if we are to understand 
what scholars have claimed is one of the most important aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophy, which 
is all but ignored by the authors, namely, Nietzsche’s “genealogical method,” or as it has come to 
be known, “psycho-genealogy,” which includes Nietzsche’s unique anti-essentialist form of 
epistemology in its connection with radical psychology. This method stresses the intimate 
communion between truth and value in Nietzsche’s philosophy, which holds the potential to 
inspire the ascending life of a culture. 
 The authors do an excellent job of rescuing Nietzsche’s position from the label of 
epistemological relativism. They argue, quite effectively, that although eschewing the notion of 
objective truth in terms of the Kantian “thing-in-itself” behind a veil of appearance, Nietzsche is 
undoubtedly concerned with perspectives that are most useful to humankind’s functioning and 
flourishing. In short, Nietzsche believes that some positions, or perspectives, are “truer” than 
others, and are beneficial to our higher-level aesthetic, spiritual, and intellectual development. It 
is possible to classify Nietzsche’s notion of truth in terms of the instrumentalist, or pragmatic, 
model. Admittedly, the authors do focus, albeit in a fleeting manner, on the issue of 
psychological motives underpinning our notions of truth, but they fail to thoroughly develop the 
all-important notion of psycho-genealogy in Nietzsche’s philosophy as it might relate to 
education, and, according to Schrift (1990) et al, from Nietzsche’s early essay on truth and lies 
(1872), a document curiously absent from the authors’ essay, through the Nachless, the 
genealogical (psychological) method remains crucial to his thought in its entirety (p. 138). 
 As stated, the authors do mention Nietzsche’s concern with motivation and its connection 
with the understanding of truth, stating that Nietzsche “rejects certain perspectives because they 
are, by virtue of a debilitating intellectual weakness, fundamentally distorted and therefore less 
true” (p. 277). The author’s incorporate a typical example extracted from Nietzsche’s corpus that 
focuses on the Christian understanding of truth and world and its inherent lack of courageous 
intellectual rigor and creative aesthetic expression, as it is grounded in the will-to-revenge, or 
ressentiment. The Christian notion of truth is far removed from Nietzsche’s conception of truth 
in terms of its pragmatic value. If we relate this aforementioned notion directly to education and 
Dewey’s progressivist model, wherein the scientific method is employed, we see that both 
thinkers adopt a similar notion of truth that is grounded in the principle of utility, e.g., truth gets 
us from point A to point B in the most efficacious manner, and so is therefore valued for that 
reason above other positions that might fall short of this end. However, it is at this point that 
Dewey and Nietzsche part ways, for Nietzsche would take serious issue with Dewey’s notion of 
democracy that undergirds his entire educational philosophy, as a phenomenon that is 
substantive, communicative, and shot through to the core with egalitarian moral virtues. 
According to Nietzsche, democracy represents a weak, anemic form of government, of social 
arrangement, for it gives equal voice to all, and in doing so, it makes all things common and 
mediocre due to its leveling effect. 
 Prior to elucidating the genealogical method, a brief description of Nietzsche’s 
conception of truth as it appears in the 1872 essay, “On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral 
Context” will be presented.  It is a unique notion of truth based on language and semiotics, most 
specifically, the process of metaphor formation. This view of truth is unique in that Nietzsche, in 
this text, adopts a formalist position, which is to say, he explicates the processes of perception, 
thought, language, and concept formation. In short, Nietzsche performs an inquiry into the 
processes of cognition and human understanding, concluding that we arrive at concepts by way 
of a process that actually puts us at a three-tier remove from our original encounter with sensate 
experience. So, in a radical move, he suggests that our thoughts, which we require to bring the 
world closer to us in knowledge, actually situates us farther from our original experiences, which 
casts a bleak, skeptical shadow over any and all claims to categorical, objective truths about the 
world. 
 There is an initial nerve stimulus from which we form an idea that is verbalized, and, 
through the process of naming, we then abstract to our concepts. Nietzsche (1979) states that as 
we move between these different levels, or realms, there can be no authentic, or 
epistemologically valid, relation between our concepts and the real world, “there is at most , an 
aesthetic relation” (p. 86).  Therefore, we can never hope to know things as they really are, and 
so the notion of truth as a form of deception is born, and it is a necessary game of deception in 
which we are at once all involved. As opposed to the traditional notion of truth that seeks to 
overcome any and all illusions, Nietzsche views truth metaphorically, and in metaphor we play 
with the illusion that there is an implied comparison between two or more things. According to 
Schrift (1990), it grows from the understanding that the human requires “life-preserving fictions, 
which apparently must be believed to be true if they are to serve their intended function” (p. 79).  
 Viewed in this manner truths are illusory and as false as lies, however, if we attend to 
Nietzsche’s instrumentalist view, and its utility for human life, we understand that some products 
of the intellect are more true than others, and, in addition, some perspectives more valuable than 
others. As Schrift (1990) states, “Truth for Nietzsche is ultimately a collection of perspectival 
illusions which, while necessary for the preservation of the human species, stands as a function 
not of truth [epistemology] but of power” (p. 138). Truth, for Nietzsche, much unlike traditional 
notions of epistemology, or any other form of pragmatism in philosophy, becomes a concern for 
axiology and not merely epistemology. And with this crucial understanding we move to examine 
the genealogical method, or psycho-genealogy. 
 According to Nehamas (1985), Nietzsche’s “genealogy reveals both the origins and the 
mechanisms by which the views in question try to conceal themselves” (p. 32). In Short, 
Nietzsche’s radical psychology seeks to unearth the hidden motives beneath our behaviors, 
which includes our drive to and formation of truth (as metaphor). This is completely at odds with 
traditional philosophy and the notions of “classical” metaphysics and epistemology. Nietzsche is 
always asking, out of what type of impulses did the drive to truth arise, and toward what end is it 
ultimately directed? Does the human’s drive to truth, which is always an expression of the will-
to-power, for Nietzsche, arise out of life-affirming drives or life negating drives? Schrift (2000) 
is quite correct in claiming that Nietzsche’s radical psychology is concerned ultimately with the 
complete and total transvaluations of values, which is the creation and determination of values 
anew. Importantly, it is an ethical project that is not limited to the domain of epistemology. To 
understand this, allows us to see that all epistemological concerns are intimately linked with 
axiological concerns, and “it is the question of value of will to power, and even concerns such as 
the quest for truth is never at a remove from the crucial assessment of values in and for human 
life” (p. 142). 
 Since it is impossible to divorce Nietzsche’s understanding of truth from the values that 
underlie it, and, considering Nietzsche was ultimately a conservative with respect to his 
conception of a national system of education, e.g., Nietzsche’s conception stems from the ancient 
Greek ideal (where misogyny, culturally elitism, phallo-centricism, and logo-centricism ruled the 
day), and most particularly from the “virtue-ethics” of Aristotle, it is difficult to rectify 
Nietzsche’s view with any contemporary notion of a liberal, democratic education. In closing, 
while Nietzsche’s perspectivism has certain implications for a notion of education that embraces 
a multiplicity of perspectives for experiencing knowledge and eschews any and all notions of 
objective, authoritarian notions of truth with a capital “T,” it is Nietzsche’s antiquated value-
system, which can never be divorced from his epistemology, that poses the problem of 
incorporating his views into the movement for educational reform in this contemporary age. If 
we read Nietzsche closely and attempt to remain true to his philosophy, it is impossible to square 
him completely with the current movement for equitable and just educational reform in this ever-
changing, heterogeneous landscape.  
 However, this is not to indicate that we should refrain from reexamining certain aspects 
of Nietzsche’s perspectivism in the attempt to tease out its positive potential value for our futural 
educational purposes, but whether or not this project would amount to what philosopher’s term, 
“winnowing the chaff from the grain” in Nietzsche’s philosophy, remains to be seen, and this 
issue might serve as the subject for another paper.  
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